This paper investigates the link between the trend in the returns to education and foreign competition in concentrated industries. We argue that the impact of foreign competition on the relative wages of less skilled workers depends on the market structure of the industry penetrated. The empirical evidence indicates that employment changes in a small group of trade-impacted concentrated industries can explain not only part of the aggregate rise in wage inequality in the United States, but also some of the differences in the trends in wage inequality across metropolitan areas. 
The standardized wage differential among the various education groups is calculated from the 1964-1991 Annual Demographic Files of the Current Population Surveys, as well as the 1950 and 1960 Public Use Samples of the U. S. Census.
In each of these cross-section surveys, we restrict the calculation to the sample of working men aged 18-64, who worked full-time in the civilian sector in the year prior to the survey, and who were not self-employed or working without pay. A worker is employed full-time if he works at least 48 weeks a year and at least 30 hours per week. We calculated the standardized wage differential in weekly earnings by estimating the following regression model in each of the cross sections: log wi = Xia + 3 (vector of dummies indexing educational attainment) + Ei, where Xi includes a fourth-order polynomial in the worker's age, and the vector of dummies indexing educational attainment includes three variables indicating whether the worker is a high school dropout; whether the worker is a high school graduate; or whether the worker has some college. The omitted variable indicates whether the worker is a college graduate. The log wage differential between college graduates and the respective education group is given by the negative of the coefficient in the vector 3. Imports, exports, and GDP are in 1987 dollars and are drawn from CITIBASE. 
FOREIGN COMPETITION AND MARKET POWER
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I. A MODEL OF TRADE, MARKET POWER, AND RELATIVE WAGES
A. Overview
A standard competitive equilibrium model of trade predicts that increased imports will raise the returns to education if the traded goods sector uses a higher proportion of less educated workers than the nontraded goods sector. The standard model, however, cannot explain why trade in different goods should have differential impacts on the college premium, when the different goods have roughly the same proportions of less educated workers.
Why does an increase in net imports of durable goods have a greater impact on relative wages? There are two related characteristics of these industries that distinguish them from other industries. First, the industries that produce durable goods tend to be more concentrated and have higher profits than other industries. For example, in 1977 the four-firm concentration ratio was 93 percent for motor vehicles and car bodies and 86 percent for turbines and turbine generators, while it was 8 percent for women's dresses (1977 Census of Manufactures). These high concentration ratios tend to manifest themselves in the performance of the industries. Between 1946 and 1973 the average rate of return in the automobile industry was 16 percent, as opposed to 9.2 percent for all manufacturing corporations and 8.1 percent for all corporations [White 1982 ]. Second, workers in more concentrated industries tend to earn higher wages. Belman and Weiss [1988] report that the elasticity of the wage with respect to concentration is between 0.07 to 0.20. They found that much of the effect operated through unions, but that there was a significant effect that operated independently of unions. Furthermore, the interindustry wage differentials estimated by Krueger and Summers [1987, 1988] suggest that workers employed in durable goods industries have relatively high wages. In 1984 workers employed in motor vehicles and parts earned 24 percent more than the average worker (holding measured skills constant), while workers in apparel earned 12 percent less. Finally, Freeman and Katz [1991] found that the wage responsiveness to demand shocks varies positively with the degree of unionization.
We consider the following story to be a plausible explanation
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for the link between trade in durable goods and wage inequality: most of the workers in durable goods manufacturing are high school dropouts or high school graduates. These workers tend to share the rents in their industry in the form of wage premiums; workers in industries with larger rents earn a higher premium. When foreign firms enter markets (domestic or foreign) in which domestic firms have substantial market power, they capture rents that would otherwise go to the domestic industry. This entry increases the relative wage of college graduates in two ways. First, because the rents of domestic firms have fallen, the wage premium of workers remaining in those industries decreases. Second, to the extent that foreign competition reduces employment in the concentrated industries, many of the workers must move to the lower paying competitive sectors of the economy. Overall, the wage of less educated workers falls relative to that of college graduates.
B. Model
We formalize this story in the context of a simple model. For a single country we analyze the general equilibrium of the domestic economy, and take net imports as exogenous. To this end, consider an economy with two sectors, 0 and 1, that produces two consumption goods, xo and x1, and that uses two types of labor, educated labor E and less educated labor L. Let us begin by analyzing sector 1, the noncompetitive sector. Suppose that sector 1 has n firms that behave as Cournot oligopolists participating in a symmetric equilibrium. Foreign countries also produce and consume the good produced by this sector. Total demand for the good x 1 by domestic consumers is given by the inverse demand curve,
where p i is the price of the good relative to the price of the other good in the economy, and ao and a1 are positive parameters. 2 The inverse demand curve perceived by each domestic firm i is given by (2) Pi = ao -ai[xii + (n -1)x'i + m], where xii is the amount produced by firm i, x' is the amount produced by each other domestic firm, and m is net imports of the 2. Later in this section we specify the consumer optimization problem from which this demand function is derived.
good. The key assumption of the Cournot model is that each firm takes other firms' quantities as given. Net imports, which are assumed to be exogenous, may be positive or negative. We are implicitly assuming that the markup on goods sold abroad is the same as the markup on goods sold domestically, so that a decrease in exports has the same impact on profits as an increase in imports.
To capture the notion that the concentrated sector is a more important employer of less educated workers than of educated workers, we assume that only less educated labor is required to produce x i . The production function for firm i is specified as
where L1, is the number of less educated workers employed by firm i in sector 1.
We assume further that each firm bargains with a union over wages and employment. In the Nash bargaining framework the firm and the union jointly maximize rents, where the rents of firm i are given by (4) Rents, = pixii -woLii, and wo is the wage in the competitive sector. The wage w 1 will be set so that the union receives a fraction -y of the rents, and the parameter ,,, depends on the exact specification of the union's objective function. For simplicity, we assume that 'y is constant. 3 Given maximization of rents by each firm and its workers, we have equilibrium production of x ii :
, ao -wo -aim (5) x lial (n + 1) ' and equilibrium rents of firm i and its workers:
ai(n + 1)2 • To obtain the wage received by the workers employed by the firm, we set the rents captured by the workforce, i.e., (w 1 -wo)Lii, equal to the product of Fy and the expression for equilibrium rents above.
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Substitution of the equilibrium value of L ii (equal to x li) yields the following expression for w i : Under the assumption of a symmetric equilibrium, domestic industry output is simply nx ti. Thus, the number of domestic workers employed in industry 1 is given by n/Ai or (8) LI = n+ 1 al Note that the wage w I is not allocative, in the sense that labor demand does not depend on w 1 . This fact implies that the demand for labor in this sector will generally not equal the supply of labor to the sector. We assume that the parameter values are such that supply always exceeds demand. We now discuss the partial equilibrium effects of net imports on this sector, taking the rest of the economy as given. First, it is clear from equation (7) that an increase in net imports decreases w sic. An increase in net imports reduces rents, so the wage premium to workers employed in the concentrated sector declines. Note that the effect is the same whether the increase is due to an increase in imports or to a decline in the oligopoly's exports to world markets. We can also study how this effect differs when the concentration of the industry changes. A natural indicator of market power in our model is n, the number of firms in the oligopoly. If n is unity, the industry is monopolistic. As n increases, the industry becomes more competitive. Market power affects the wage only through its effect on rents per worker. It is easy to see from equation (7) that a2wV(anam) > 0. In other words, the more competitive the industry (the larger the n), the lower the impact of net imports on rents per worker and hence the smaller is the decline in wages.
It is also useful to discuss the interaction of net imports and concentration on the equilibrium wage bill of sector 1, which is w IL I. The interesting experiment is a change in the degree of concentration without a change in the relative size of the industry. Thus, we must make adjustments so that the industry size does not change when n changes. There are many ways of making this adjustment. The easiest way is to multiply a(u) 1/4)/am by the factor (n + 1)/n before taking the derivative with respect to n. Thus, the negative impact of net imports on the wage bill is stronger when the industry is more concentrated, holding industry size constant. This partial equilibrium result forms the basis for a similar result in the economywide equilibrium model. We now briefly sketch the structure of the rest of the economy. Industry 0 is the competitive sector. We assume that the production function for this industry is Cobb-Douglas, with inputs of educated labor E and less educated labor Lo. Maximization of profits gives the following first-order conditions:
we = (1 -(3)LgE -13 , where wo is the wage of less educated workers in this sector, W e is the wage of educated workers, the price of x 0 has been normalized to one, and i3 lies between 0 and 1. These conditions simply equate the wage of each type of labor to its marginal product.
To abstract from distributional effects, we assume that there is a representative worker-consumer, who supplies both types of labor.4 This consumer has the utility function, U = Xo + OLoX 1 -ilaiX I , a0, al > 0; and labor endowments, (11) Lo + Li < 1, (12) E < E.
Given prices, it is easy to show that the consumer's demand function for x1 is exactly as given in equation (1). Because the consumer has no disutility of labor, he will supply his labor inelastically, so equations (11) and (12) will hold with equality. The amount of labor supplied to sector 1 will be determined by the demand for labor in that sector, rather than by the consumer's choice because of the assumed presence of excess supply in 4. Adding two types of consumers would only complicate the model and would not change the basic results concerning the effect of foreign competition on relative wages.
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equilibrium. Thus, the supply of labor to the competitive sector will be the excess of the labor endowment over the amount of labor demanded by the oligopoly. Finally, we assume balanced trade, so that the foreigners spend their earnings from the concentrated sector on the goods from the competitive sector. 5 This assumption does not affect the impact of net imports on wage inequality.
C. Equilibrium Effects of Foreign Competition
Because the system of equations is block recursive, we can determine equilibrium w o, w1, we, Lo, L1, and E using only equations (7) In deriving this result, we apply the same adjustment factor for industry size as we did in the partial equilibrium analysis above. The positive sign of the cross derivative implies that the negative impact of foreign competition on our measure of wage inequality (i.e., the educational wage differential) is smaller when the industry being penetrated is more competitive.
The model presented in this section supports the intuition in the story we told above. Net imports into concentrated industries capture rents that would otherwise be shared with workers in the form of wage premiums. This effect should be greater in industries with higher rents.
The model, while simple and specific, also raises some very interesting questions. The model suggests that the types of goods < 0. dm
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that a country imports and exports are important. Katz and Summers [1989] have also made this point, based on differential industry wage premiums for all workers. Our model links those premiums to market power, and specifies that less educated workers are the primary recipients.
We conclude this section by discussing an alternative interpretation of our model. Because we seek to provide a theoretical foundation for the time series evidence, we have focused on trade as the source of shifts in relative demand. Other types of forces that shift demand for the good produced by the concentrated sector, however, would have similar effects on wage inequality. In our model, a shift in preferences, such as a decline in ao, would have effects similar to an increase in m. In a more general model, any kind of preference shift or changes in technology that affected the demand for concentrated goods would have consequences for the rents received by the concentrated sector, and hence for wage inequality. We note this generalization because our empirical work presented below suggests that trade is not the only factor that contributed to the decline of some concentrated industries.
II. TRADE, EMPLOYMENT, AND WAGES IN CONCENTRATED INDUSTRIES
In this section we show that employment changes in a relatively small number of concentrated industries may have had a substantial impact on aggregate wage inequality during the 1980s, and that a significant portion of the employment decline in these industries can be linked to foreign trade.
A. Data
To illustrate the link between employment in concentrated industries, net imports, and wage inequality, we must unavoidably combine a variety of data sources. Our data on wages and employment by education level and industry are drawn from the 1977-1991 Annual Demographic Files of the Current Population Surveys (CPS). The 1976-1990 sample period is selected because the 1977 CPS is the first that identifies a relatively large number of metropolitan areas (which we use in our study of local labor markets in the next section), and because the way that a worker's educational attainment is measured changed substantially begin-ning with the 1992 CPS. We restrict our analysis to the sample of workers (both men and women) aged 18-64 who worked full-time in the civilian sector in the year prior to the survey, and who were not self-employed or working without pay. 6 Throughout the study the wage variable is the natural logarithm of average weekly earnings in the calendar year prior to the survey. All wages were converted to 1982 dollars using the GNP implicit deflator for personal consumption. We exclude workers whose weekly earnings fall below $67, and we recoded the wage measure for those workers whose earnings were topcoded by multiplying the topcode value times 1.45. These refinements of the wage data match those used by Katz and Murphy [1992] in their comprehensive study of the wage structure.
We use the worker's completed educational attainment to categorize workers into one of four skill groups: (1) workers with less than a high school education (or "high school dropouts"); (2) high school graduates; (3) workers with some college education; and (4) workers with at least a college degree. To obtain ageadjusted wage differentials across these education groups, we estimated the following regression model in each of the CPS cross sections: 4 (13) log wit = XitRt + E.YitSiit + sit, j= 1 where wit is the log weekly earnings of person i in calendar year t; X is a vector of standardizing variables; and Sift (j = 1, . . . , 4) is a vector of dummy variables indicating the worker's educational attainment, where the j index corresponds to the education categories defined above. The vector of standardizing variables X includes a fourth-order polynomial in the worker's age, a dummy variable indicating the worker's gender, and a dummy variable indicating whether the worker is white or nonwhite.
We use the vector of regression coefficients 'y from equation (13) to calculate two measures of the age-adjusted returns to skills in each calendar year. In particular, we calculate the standardized log wage differential between college graduates and high school graduates (whs), and the standardized log wage differential between college graduates and high school dropouts (wdp). These wage 6. A worker is classified as working full-time if he or she works more than 48 weeks during the year, and the usual workweek lasts at least 30 hours. 
B. Selection of Trade-Impacted Concentrated Industries
We begin by isolating a group of highly concentrated industries that experienced a significant change in their trade positions over the period. The selection of these industries is complicated by the fact that the concentration ratios, employment, shipments, and trade data are reported for four-digit SIC industries, while the wage and educational composition data are drawn from the CPS, which uses the three-digit Census industry classifications (CIC).
We include any CIC manufacturing industry in our group of industries if (1) the majority of workers in the (CIC) industry were in four-digit (SIC) industries that had four-firm concentration ratios greater than 40 percent (as reported by the 1977 Census of 7. Trade and Employment reports both quarterly and annual import and export by four-digit SIC code (in most cases). The import data are from " Table 1 
C. Employment and Wage Changes
We now present an accounting exercise which shows that employment changes in our sample of trade-impacted concentrated industries can plausibly account for a significant fraction of the change in aggregate wage inequality. Figure II shows the percent of the labor force employed in these industries by education in the 1976-1990 period. In 1976 almost 8 percent of high school dropouts were employed by these industries, as compared with only 2.3 percent of college graduates. The data also indicate, however, that the percent of less educated workers employed by these industries declined substantially during the 1980s.
Consider the following expression for the average log wage of a particular education group:
where w; is the average log wage for workers in the jth education group, wci is the log wage that this group receives in the less 9. For this selection procedure we were forced to use the change over the 1976 to 1985 period because the ITLM trade data for all four-digit manufacturing industries were available only until 1985. We obtained trade data through 1990 for only the selected industries.
10. Although it met the three criteria, we excluded electrical equipment not elsewhere classified (CIC 208) because it mixed very different industries. We also excluded several other industries because the combination of industries within the CIC codes changed over the period. We conduct the decomposition in equation (16) for each of the eleven CIC industries in our group, and then aggregate across industries. The fraction of workers in each education group employed by our industries (as well as by the competitive sector) is easily obtained from the CPS. We estimated an industry wage premium for each education level by regressing the log of the weekly wage (in a particular CPS cross section) on a quartic in age, race, sex, and a vector of eleven industry dummies. In 1976 high school dropouts in our industries earned a weighted average of 26 percent more than high school dropouts outside our industries, high school graduates earned a 17 percent industry premium, and college graduates earned a 16 percent industry premium. Thus, the typical high school dropout benefited relatively more from being employed in the concentrated industries.
Calculating the effect of the change in industrial composition on the competitive wage is somewhat more complicated. We employ a procedure similar to the one used by Borjas, Freeman, and in their study of the impact of immigration and trade on relative wages. The change in the competitive wage of college graduates relative to, say, high school dropouts that is due to spillovers from the concentrated industry can be written as ( 17) A(wc,c/ -W c,dp) = i A[log (1 -fd) -log (1 -fdp)1, where c/ denotes college graduate, dp denotes high school dropout, and 'q is the relative factor price elasticity (giving the percentage change in the relative wage of skilled workers for a given percentage change in the relative quantity of skilled workers). 12 Table I shows the results of the accounting exercise. The actual change in the log of the college wage relative to high school dropouts was 0.191 from 1976 to 1990, and the actual change in the college wage relative to high school graduates was 0.139. Our calculations indicate that the change in the fraction of workers receiving the wage premiums in our group of industries contributed between 0.004 and 0.010 log points, while the change in the industry wage premiums over the 1976-1990 period contributed a negligible amount to the difference between high school dropouts and college graduates and .003 points to the difference between high school graduates and college graduates.
Finally, the spillover of less educated workers to the competi-12. To see how we derived this expression, note that the overall wage change can be written as ti(wc,d -wc,d_p) = 10 log (K,d/Ec,dp), where Ec1 is the number of type-j workers employed in the competitive sector. The right-hand side can be further decomposed into spillover effects and demographic changes. In particular, Eci = (1 -fj )Ti, where 7:i is the total supply of type-j workers in the economy. Changes in f represent industrial composition changes, whereas changes in TT represent demographic changes. tive sector increased the relative supply of less educated workers so as to raise the college premium substantially. The impact on the wage depends on the relative factor price elasticity. If this elasticity is minus one, then the spillover effect alone generates a 0.035 point change in the log wage ratio of college graduates relative to dropouts and a 0.019 point change in the case of college graduates relative to high school graduates. Borjas, Freeman, and Katz [19921 estimated the relative factor price elasticity between collegeeducated workers and high school dropouts to be -0.32. This elasticity value would then imply that the employment decline in these industries raised the college premium (relative to high school dropouts) by 0.011 log points.
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According to this accounting exercise, the changes in the employment and skill composition of workers employed in our group of industries can explain a reasonable fraction of the decline in the relative wage of less skilled workers over the 1976-1990 period. Most of the impact, however, comes from spillover effects, rather than from composition changes or changes in the industry wage premiums. We chose our group of industries based on their trade experience. We now quantify how much of the change in employment in our group of industries can be linked to changes in net imports. In this exercise we take the change in net imports to be exogenous to supply conditions in the industries, a reasonable assumption if the trade experience of the 1980s was in large part due to the effects of monetary and fiscal policy on the exchange rate (e.g., Sachs [19881) and to the impact of the oil shocks on the composition of automobile demand. We further assume that the impact of trade on the industry is accurately reflected in changes in the value of shipments. 13 To quantify the full impact of trade on industry demand, we include both direct and indirect imports and exports. For example, to calculate the impact of trade on employment in the steel industry, we account not only for the direct imports of rolled steel sheets, but also for the quantity of steel sheets imported in the form of fabricated metal, machinery, and transportation equipment. We use input-output tables to account for these indirect effects of trade. 14 Finally, we convert the effect of dollar-valued trade data into employment. Because total shipments can be decomposed into domestic demand and net imports, we write the following identity for employment: 14. We encountered problems in merging the various data sets because the Department of Commerce uses its own set of industry codes for the input-output tables. The only industry that did not match well was ships and boats, so we ignored indirect trade effects on it. There were slight discrepancies between the makeup of the industries in the Department of Commerce codes and the Census codes in the case of primary metals. When input-output tables were used for indirect effects, we aggregated according to the Commerce codes; for direct effects, we aggregated to the Census codes. In any case, the differences were very small. The table used for the input-output analysis is the 1977 Input-Output Commodity-by-Industry Direct Requirements (Table 3) We deflate the nominal value of net imports to the relevant base year.i5 Table II shows the results of the calculations for the two periods, as well as the sum over the entire period. All of the industries in our group experienced substantial declines in employment from 1976 to 1985, as well as for the entire period of 1976 to 1990. Most of the industries experienced a decline in employment from 1985 to 1990, but the aggregate decline during this period was less than 20 percent of the decline during the first period. Table II indicates that the change in trade explains 68 percent of the total decline in employment between 1976 and 1985. Between 1985 and 1990, however, the trade situation improved for most industries, so that the net effect of trade on employment was positive. If we add the results from the two periods, however, the trade impact is substantially negative. For the entire period the 15. We use industry-specific deflators. The deflators through 1985 are from the NBER database. We used a shipments-weighted average of the four-digit SIC deflators to obtain deflators for the CIC industries. For the period 1985 to 1990 we used the inflation rates implied by CITIBASE price indices to update the NBER indices. We attempted to choose price series that were closest to our industries. The CITIBASE indices used were as follows: glass: the implicit GDP deflator for stone, clay, and glass; primary iron and steel: the producer price index for iron and steel; nonferrous metals: the producer price index for nonferrous metals; engines and turbines: the deflator for investment in engines and turbines; farm equipment: the deflator for investment in farm equipment; household appliances: producer price index for household appliances; motor vehicles and parts: the producer price index for motor vehicles and parts; ships and boats: the producer price index for transportation equipment. Taking the result that trade accounted for half of the employment decline from 1976 to 1990, we can then return to our earlier 16. If we use 1976 as the base year for evaluating the change for both periods, we find that trade accounts for 75 percent of the decline in employment from 1976 to 1985 and for 53 percent of the decline in employment for the entire period. These numbers are slightly higher because they do not allow for technological progress over the period, which reduced the ratio of employment to shipments.
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calculation and analyze the overall impact of trade in these industries on the returns to skills. Recall that the impact of employment declines in these industries depend significantly on the assumed relative factor price elasticity. If one believes that this elasticity is as high as minus one, then the combined results suggest that trade could have accounted for a tenth of the rise in the returns to skills. Thus, the trade experience of this small group of industries can explain a noticeable fraction of the rise in the college premium.
III. EVIDENCE FROM DIFFERENCES ACROSS METROPOLITAN AREAS
A. Motivation
We now test the predictions of our theoretical model using time-series and cross-sectional variation across a number of economies. We wish to test our theory across economies rather than industries because our theory has general equilibrium implications about spillovers into the competitive labor market. Ideally, one would test the theory across countries, but gathering international information on wage inequality and industrial organization is a daunting task. Instead, we test our theory using local economies in the United States. As long as labor is partially immobile across cities, so that relative wage movements differ, we can treat the competitive sector of each city as an isolated economy, at least in the short run. Below, we will show that relative wage movements do vary substantially across cities, suggesting that the assumption of segregated labor markets is reasonable. We would expect that those areas of the country which lose more worker rents would experience a larger increase in the returns to skill, both overall (as a result of composition effects) and in the competitive sector (as a result of spillover effects). We explore these hypotheses by analyzing the determinants of the differences that exist in the wage structure across metropolitan areas.
We have shown that foreign competition was an important factor in the employment decline experienced by our group of concentrated industries. For the purposes of the city analysis, however, competition from other cities within the United States can have an impact as well. If a highly concentrated industry moves from city A to city B, we would expect wage inequality to increase in city A relative to city B. For this reason, and because it is impossible to allocate the U. S. trade deficit to different areas of the country, we link wage inequality to the proportion of workers employed in trade-impacted concentrated industries in the city, as this number is probably the best available indicator of rents flowing to workers within a city.
We use data from the 1977-1991 March CPS files, but we limit the sample to workers living in one of the 44 metropolitan areas that can be identified in each of the cross sections. To obtain the city-specific age-adjusted wage differentials across education groups, we estimated the following regression model in each cross section: Pittsburgh earned 39 percent more than high school graduates in 1976, and only 47 percent more in 1990.
B. Empirical Results
The main objective of our empirical analysis is to test whether our theory, which was formulated to explain the aggregate timeseries behavior of wages, can also explain the intercity differences in the evolution of the wage structure during the 1980s. In particular, consider the regression model: (21) Ykt = 100 + 4431 + Vk + ilt + €kt, where the dependent variable ykt is the college premium in metropolitan area k in year t (relative to either high school dropouts or high school graduates); Ikt is a vector of variables indicating the industrial composition of the labor market; Zkt is a vector of variables describing other characteristics of the locality, including the fraction of the adult population that is foreign-born, the female labor force participation rate, and the locality's unemployment rate; vk is a metropolitan area fixed effect; 11, is a period fixed effect; and the disturbance Ekt is assumed to be uncorrelated with the other variables in the mode1. 17 The vector Ikt decomposes manufacturing employment into four categories: the proportion of workers employed in our group of trade-impacted concentrated industries; the proportion employed in trade-impacted competitive industries, the proportion employed in other durable goods industries, and the proportion employed in other manufacturing. Our theory suggests that changes in employment in the first of these categories should have the greatest adverse impact on wage inequality. In the last section we defined the sample of industries that were trade-impacted and concentrated. Because a very large fraction of the trade in the competitive sector was concentrated in two industries, we used the proportion of workers employed in apparel (151) and footwear (221) to measure the relative importance of the trade-impacted competitive sector. In 1976 high school dropouts and high school graduates constituted 89 percent of their workforce. Thus, these industries have an even higher factor ratio of less educated workers than the high concentration industries.
Columns 1 of Table IV indicate that there is a strong negative correlation between the returns to skills and the proportion of the workforce employed in trade-impacted concentrated industries. For instance, a ten-point increase in the proportion of workers who are employed in these industries increases the relative wage of high school dropouts by 7 percent, and that of high school graduates by 3 percent. The relative importance of employment in trade-impacted concentrated industries as a determinant of the returns to skills is particularly evident in the regressions that include vectors of period fixed effects or city fixed effects. In every case the coefficient on employment in these industries is more negative than for employment in any of the other industries. Employment in the so-called competitive industries always enters with a positive sign. This positive coefficient might be caused by a tautological relationship: these industries pay lower than average wages to unskilled workers. Even when the regressions control for both sets of fixed effects, the returns to skills are still significantly negatively correlated with the proportion of the workforce employed in trade-impacted concentrated industries. 18 The regressions in Table W also include a number of control variables that have independent effects on the wage structure. For instance, the proportion of the adult population that is foreignborn has a strong negative impact on the relative wage of high school dropouts. The coefficient is not only statistically but numerically important. Even after controlling for period and city fixed effects, a ten-point increase in the proportion of workers who are foreign-born lowers the wage of high school dropouts (relative to that of college graduates) by 6.6 percent. 19 Recent work [Grant and Hamermesh 1981; Topel 1994 ] also suggests that the entry of women into the labor market may have had a negative impact on the wage of unskilled workers. Our regressions indicate that the labor market's female labor force participation rate generally has a positive impact on the college premium as long as period fixed effects are not included in the regression. Removing the aggregate time-variation in the data eliminates much of the correlation between changes in female labor supply and the returns to skills.
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Finally, the regressions include the labor market's unemployment rate so as to control for differential impacts of the business cycle. Table IV suggests a positive correlation between the unemployment rate and the returns to skills after controlling for period and city fixed effects. In other words, unskilled workers are worse off during periods of high unemployment.
C. Robustness of the Results
There is an important sense in which these regression results are not surprising. It is well-known that workers in trade-impacted concentrated industries earn more than other workers, so that a labor market with a higher percentage of workers in these industries will necessarily have a higher average wage for its less 18. We also estimated the model including both current and lagged fractions of workers in the concentrated sector to allow for adjustment lags. With few exceptions, the lagged variables were not significant, suggesting that the effects on wages occurred within the year.
19. Some caution is required when using these results to infer the impact of immigrants on the wage of native workers. The CPS does not contain information on the birthplace of workers, so that part of the impact of immigration on the wage structure is probably due to a change in the composition of the workforce. In particular, the entry of relatively unskilled immigrants would reduce the wages of unskilled workers, even if immigrants had no impact on the earnings of natives. educated workers. As a result, the negative correlation between the proportion employed in trade-impacted concentrated industries and the college premium can be interpreted as tautological.
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It is instructive, therefore, to investigate whether the impact of spillovers is sufficiently important that the negative correlation persists even after we net out this compositional effect. We do this by investigating whether the industrial composition of the workforce has an impact on the relative wage of unskilled workers employed outside trade-impacted concentrated industries. Table V presents regressions identical to those reported earlier, except that the returns to skills are estimated on the subsample of workers employed outside the concentrated industries. The results suggest a statistically and economically significant spillover effect. A tenpoint increase in the proportion of the workforce that is employed in the concentrated industries increases the relative wage of high school dropouts by 7.5 percent, and that of high school graduates by 3.6 percent, even after controlling for both city and period fixed effects.
These two estimates are more negative than the estimates from the regressions using all workers. This difference is not necessarily an anomaly. Suppose that wages in the unionized sector are set at the national level, with little variation across localities. In this instance, the proportion of workers in the city employed in the concentrated sector should have little effect on the wage of those in the concentrated industry, once national influences are controlled for with period effects. Thus, the regression that includes those workers in the dependent variable can in principle yield a smaller (in absolute value) coefficient.2°O ur theoretical model suggests that the impact of net imports in concentrated industries on the wage structure works through the fact that these industries are unionized. It is not surprising, therefore, that if the regressions also control for the proportion of the workforce that is a member of a union, the coefficient of the employment share variable is weakened.
Table VI presents the basic set of regressions that include the metropolitan area's unionization rate. As expected, the unionization variable has a negative impact on the college premium in the locality. A ten-point increase in the unionization rate reduces the relative wage of college graduates by one to two percentage points (depending on whether the base is high school graduates or high school dropouts). The inclusion of the unionization variable does not reduce the coefficient on employment in trade-impacted concentrated industries substantially. In particular, a ten-point increase in the share of employment in these industries still increases the relative wage of high school dropouts by 3.7 percentage points, and that of high school graduates by 3.0 percentage points. 20. The direction of the change in the coefficient depends on two opposing effects: including the nationally set wage of the concentrated industry in the dependent variable lowers the magnitude of the regression coefficient, but using the fraction employed in the concentrated sector to form the weighted average raises the magnitude of the coefficient. employed in concentrated industries to calculate the impact on the returns to skills of workers moving from the concentrated industries to nonmanufacturing jobs.21 If we use the specification that controls for city fixed effects (but not for period fixed effects), the decline in the fraction employed in concentrated industries can account for between 12 and 14 percent of the increase in the returns to skills. 22 Using our earlier result that about half of the decline in employment was a result of trade, we conclude that the regression estimates imply that increases in net imports accounted for between 6 and 7 percent of the aggregate increase in wage inequality.
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Iv. SUMMARY
This paper presents and tests the hypothesis that foreign competition in highly concentrated industries was an important factor underlying the increase in the returns to skills observed during the 1980s. Our theoretical framework suggests that net imports of goods produced in concentrated markets have a much larger impact on the wage structure than net imports of goods produced in competitive markets. In particular, foreign competition in concentrated industries transfers rents from less educated workers to foreign producers. The more concentrated the domestic industry, the larger is the loss of rents and hence the greater is the decline in the relative wage of less educated workers.
Because our hypothesis singles out a particular sector of the economy as responsible for an important part of the trend in the college premium, we performed simple accounting exercises to determine whether changes in a set of trade-impacted concentrated industries could have a measurable impact on the returns to skills. We found that the shift of workers out of the concentrated sector into the rest of the economy could account for up to 23 percent of 21. Alternatively, we could match the coefficients on the four manufacturing sectors included in the regressions to the actual decline in those sectors. We do not do this because the coefficient on the proportion in trade-impacted competitive industries is large relative to the other coefficients, but at the same time imprecisely estimated (probably because there are small samples of these workers in most cities).
22. Specifications that include city fixed effects are the most appropriate because they net out idiosyncratic differences across cities. It is not clear, however, that controlling for time effects is appropriate in the context of this simulation. In particular, if there are spillovers across labor markets, in the sense that the decline in concentrated employment in city A has an impact on the wage in city B, the period effects are overcontrolling because aggregate employment in these industries also matters.
